In this paper a method for the replacement, in formulas, of strong quantifiers by functions is introduced that can be considered as an alternative to Skolemization in the setting of constructive theories. A constructive extension of intuitionistic predicate logic that captures the notions of preorder and existence is introduced and the method, orderization, is shown to be sound and complete with respect to this logic. This implies an analogue of Herbrand's theorem for intuitionistic logic. The orderization method is applied to the constructive theories of equality and groups.
Introduction
Although seldomly mentioned, Skolemization is a method often used in mathematics. In computer science, where its presence is more conspicuous, it is at the basis of many an application. In mathematics Skolemization is mostly applied in the replacement of an axiom of the form ∀x∃yA(x, y) by an axiom of the form ∀xA(x, f x) for a new function f that is added to the language. That this operation does not change the theory follows from the fact that
∀x∃yA(x, y) B ⇔ ∀xA(x, f x) B.
In computer science, Skolemization often appears in combination with Herbrand's theorem, which states that for a formula ∃y 1 Namely, by first applying Skolemization to a formula B that is of the form ∃y 1 ∀x 1 . . . ∃y n ∀x n A(y 1 , . . . , y n ), where A is quantifier free, we obtain a correspondce between predicate and propositional logic that, although easy to prove, is of fundamental importance:
A(t i1 , f 1 (t i1 ), t i2 , f 2 (t i1 , t i2 ), . . . , t in , f n (t i1 , . . . , t in )).
It has been known for a long time that there is no such correspondence in intuitionistic logic, because although sound, Skolemization fails to be complete for this logic; we do have
in fact, we even have IQC (A → A S ), but in general the converse does not hold,
Here A S is the Skolemization of A. Examples of this phenomenon are
and, in the context of axioms,
∀x∃yA(x, y) IQC ∀x∀y∃u∃v(A(x, u) ∧ A(y, v) ∧ (x = y → u = v)),

∀xA(x, f x) IQC ∀x∀y∃u∃v(A(x, u) ∧ A(y, v) ∧ (x = y → u = v)).
The last example indicates that in a constructive setting replacing an axiom ∀x∃yA(x, y) by ∀xA(x, f x) does not create a conservative extension of the original theory, as is the case for classical theories. Observe that in the two examples above Skolemization is not restricted to prenex formulas, but is applied to infix formulas as well. Of course, in the context of intuitionistic logic we have to extend the Skolemization method to such formulas because in this logic not every formula has a prenex normal form. Therefore, in this setting Skolemization means the replacement of strong quantifiers, i.e. positive universal and negative existential quantifiers, by functions, as can be seen in the examples above. The class of formulas for which Skolemization is complete is well-understood, mostly due to beautiful work by Grigori Mints who characterized a large part of this class and proved many results on the subject, including Herbrand-like theorems for intuitionistic logic [10, 11, 12, 14, 15] . Another line of research focusses on automated theorem proving in intuitionistic logic. Here one analyzes the cases in which a proof of A S can be transformed into a proof of A, as in the papers by Fitting [8] , Kreitz et al. [9] , Mints [13] , Shankar [17] and Wallen [19] . This work has many applications and contains deep insights, especially on the proof theory of intuitionistic logic.
Orderization
In this paper, like in the work by Mints, we approach the problem from a less application orientated and more foundational point of view. We start by analyzing the reasons for the incompleteness of Skolemization in a constructive setting. As it turns out, the fact that Skolemization fails to be complete for intuitionistic logic is related to the expressive power of the logic. We show that by extending intuitionistic logic by a preorder and an existence predicate we can define a translation, called orderization and denoted by () o , which can be viewed as a sound and complete alternative to Skolemization. That is, we define a logic IQCO with corresponding sequent calculus LJO, which are extensions of IQC and LJ, such that for all sequents S in the original language
Here io stands for LJO . As in Skolemization, the method replaces strong quantifiers by functions in a canonical way, but it also uses the extra expressive power of the logic, i.e. the order relation and the existence predicate that are part of the language. Thus S o is a formula that contains no strong quantifiers but might contain these two additional predicates. What is important is that IQCO is a constructive extension of IQC. The following observation might help the reader to appreciate this fact. The statement that a formula A is true in intuitionistic logic, i.e. that it holds in all Kripke models, can be expressed in predicate logic, say by a formula T (A). By Skolemizing this formula we obtain IQC 
A ⇔ CQC T (A) ⇔ CQC (T (A))
S .
Besides being a trivial observation, this fact does not teach us anything about intuitionistic logic, which is our final aim. Also, the formula T (A) will in general be huge even if A is not, which makes the method less applicable and unelegant. In contrast, IQCO is a constructive theory and A o is fairly close to A . There is not one unique answer to the problem of Skolemization in intuitionistic logic. One could take its failure at face value and not search for alternatives, or one could look for alternatives in other directions than the ones discussed above. Thus the answer given in this paper is just one possible answer, and in the future other approaches may emerge that prove fruitful as well.
Theories
After introducing the notion of orderization and proving the above mentioned results, the method will be applied to constructive theories. Here the situation changes slightly in that we have to orderize the theories as well. In classical logic Skolemization does not affect the theory at hand:
In the case of orderization we obtain
where T k is a translation of T . In fact, this translation is part of orderization in that A o is defined as (A k ) S . In many cases, T k can be replaced by the theory itself, often with one extra axiom, as in the case of equality and groups. The results on orderization easily imply analogues of Herbrand's theorem for theories T for which T k is universal. It will be shown that for every sequent S in the original language there exists a quantifier free ∧∨-expansion
As we will see, al theories discussed in this paper have decidable quantifier free fragments. Thus it is decidable whether the ∧∨-expansion of sequents of the form S o are derivable in the theory or not. Finally, a remark on the proof methods in this paper. Skolemization and Herbrands's theorem have a strong proof theoretic flavour and are easy to prove for classical logic once the right proof system is considered. In fact, the proofs of many other results on Skolemization rely on proof theoretic methods as well. On the other hand, almost all proofs in this paper use models, even though IQCO has a well-behaved sequent calculus LJO. Proof theoretic proofs would be a worthwhile addition to these results, as they might lead the way to an algorithm that translates proofs of S o into proofs of S. However, that in the setting of Skolemization semantical arguments can lead to insights that are yet not clearly visible from the proof theoretic point of view is an interesting phenomenon in itself.
Skolemization
In this section we will analyze the failure of Skolemization in intuitionistic predicate logic IQC and from this observation derive the construction of an alternative Skolemization method called orderization. This section contains all the intuitions behind the results to come, which will be made precise and proved in the next sections. We denote by A S the Skolemization of a formula A. That is, A S is the result of replacing every strong quantifier QxB(x,ȳ) in A by B(f (ȳ),ȳ), whereȳ are the variables of the weak quantifiers in the scope of which QxB(x,ȳ) occurs. We require that every Skolem function f in A S is distinct from the others, is in L s , and does not occur in A. Following Sam Buss in [6, 7] , the Herbrandization A H of a formula is the result of replacing every weak quantifier QxB(x,ȳ) in A by B(f (ȳ),ȳ), whereȳ are the variables of the strong quantifiers in the scope of which QxB(x,ȳ) occurs. The same requirements as for A S apply. 
Examples of countermodels to these formulas are given in the following picture.
We know that it is impossible to make these models into countermodels of ED S and UP S because these formulas are derivable. The following could be considered as the "reasons" for this failure, reasons that are different for M and N . In M , the fact that 1 is not an element of the domain in the root blocks the possibility that in this node we could interpret the Skolem constant c as 1 and force ¬¬P c. In N , no number n in the domain N can serve as the interpretation of the c in ¬¬(P c ∨ ¬P c), as eventually P n ∨ ¬P n will be forced, and thus ¬¬(P c ∨ ¬P c) would be forced in the root.
The existence predicate
How could we extend the expressive power of intuitionistic logic in such a way that we could transform the countermodels M and N of ED and UP into countermodels of ED S and UP S ? That is, is there a constructive extension of IQC such that using the increased expressive power, an analogue of Skolemization can be defined. An analogue for which completeness can be proved by transforming countermodels of a formula into countermodels of its Skolemized counterpart, i.e. of the formula that is the translation of the original formula under this alternative of Skolemization. What we are after can best be explained by a solution to the problem for existential quantifiers that the authors proposed in [4] . In that paper an extension IQCE of IQC first introduced by Dana Scott [16] was used. This logic is intuitionistic logic extended by a so-called existence predicate E, a unary predicate that denotes that a term exists, the idea being that the existence predicate has to be included in quantified statements. For example, to conclude ∃xAx both At and Et should be established for some term t. A sequent calculus LJE [4, 3, 1, 2] for this logic consists of the rules and connectives of LJ and the following quantifier rules.
The semantics of IQC has to be adapted accordingly. For example, k ∃xAx holds if and only if k Ed ∧ Ad for some element d ∈ D k . LJE is sound and complete with respect to this semantics. It is not difficult to see that in this case one can restrict the semantics to models with constant domains, because the existence predicate cuts out the existing elements at every node seperately. Because of this, the problem with model M above disappears: every element has a name in the root but might come into existence at a later point only. By interpreting c as 1, the following pictures presents a countermodel to ED s .
The right side is a countermodel to ED s because the root forces ¬¬P 1 but not ∃x¬¬P x because E1 does not hold in the root. The precise result on this logic with existence is as follows. In this context the ESkolemization A s of A is the result of replacing every strong quantifier
Then it can be shown that for a set of axioms A of the form Et, ESkolemization can indeed be viewed as an alternative to Skolemization (we skip some details):
For each closed sequent S in which all strong quantifiers are existential:
In fact, stronger results than these have been proved in [4] , but this theorem suffices to explain the intuition on countermodels discussed above. Indeed, the ESkolemization ED s of ED is the formula
which, like ED itself, is not derivable in LJE. Since IQCE is a natural and constructive extension of IQC, ESkolemization could be considered as an analogue or alternative to Skolemization for constructive settings. But, alas! the method only applies to existential quantifiers. In the next section we show how the universal quantifiers can be dealt with.
Orderization
It is not difficult to see that the above technique of transforming countermodels of formulas to countermodels of their Skolemization or ESkolemization does not appply to universal quantifiers. Indeed, the ESkolemization ¬¬(Ec → P c∨¬P c) of UP is still derivable. Here the infinity of the model plays a role, as any finite model forces UP. The idea is that this infinity should be expressible in the logic in order to be able to Skolemize universal quantifiers. Of course, there are many ways to do this, for example by using infinite disjunctions and conjunctions, or by using second-order logic. Recall however that our aim is to stay as close to intuitionistic predicate logic as possible and remain constructive as well. As it turns out, surprisingly little is needed to make the intuition about representing infinity work. Besides the existence predicate we extend the language by a preorder and a binary function , . Intuitively, expressions A k, d denote that Ad is forced at node k. The axioms we add to IQC state that is a preorder and that upwards persistency holds for expressions A k, d . In fact, we do less, but for the sake of clarity we omit some details here. The resulting system is called IQCO, the O for order. Like IQCE, IQCO has a simple sequent calculus LJO which is sound and complete for Kripke models of IQCO. Moreover it clearly is a constructive logic, and possesses many of the properties one would wish sych a system to have, like the disjunction property and the existence property. For the orderization translation the results mentioned in the introduction will be proved in the subsequent sections. Hopefully they convince the reader that orderization can indeed be seen as, maybe not the, but certainly a reasonable analogue of Skolemization in a constructive setting.
The logics
As explained in the introduction, we will mainly work with a constructive extension of intuitionistic logic, IQCO, that contains axioms for certain specific predicates and functions in the langauge. To distinguish the Skolem functions from our original language we use three languages L, L o and L s that are assumed to be disjunct. L can be any language for first-order logic. L s , the Skolem language, constains infinitely many variables k, l, . . . , and for every arity infinitely many functions. Constants are treated as nullary functions. L o consists of the constants , ι, unary predicates K and E, a binary predicate , and a binary function ·, · . Thus in this case we do not only have Skolem functions but also three distinguished predicates, two distinguished constants and a distinguished function. Intuitively, these symbols enable the description of a Kripke model, or at least part of it: K is the set of nodes, is the preorder, ι is the root, an element in the domain of the root, E an existence predicate that describes the domains of the nodes, and the function , that expresses at which node a given formula is evaluated. As mentioned above, A k, t describes that "At is forced at node k". Some words on notation. For n-ary formulas A(x) andā = a 1 , . . . , a n we use the following abbreviation:
To improve transparancy we sometimes suppress atomic formulas of the form Kk in a formula: in most situations ∀l kA(l) is short for ∀l(Kl∧l k → A(l)). We will remind the reader of this convention at several points in the paper. We write A ∈ L if A is a formula in the language L, and likewise for the other languages.
Gentzen calculi
In this section we introduce the Gentzen calculi on which all theories that are discussed in this paper are based. First we recall the Gentzen calculus LJ for intuitionistic predicate logic, and then we extend it to the calculus LJO that includes the extra axioms that we discussed in the introduction. In the next sequent we discuss the Kripke models for this logic. Sequents are expressions of the form Γ ⇒ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are multisets. Γ and ∆ will always range over multisets of formulas.
The system LJ
Here ( * ) denotes the condition that y does not occur free in Γ and C. LK is the classical version of LJ, that is, LJ in which the formula C is replaced by ∆, and ∆'s are added to the succedents of the right rules, and to which contraction at the right is added:
We write LJ S if the sequent S is derivable in LJ. For a set of sequents S, we say that S is derivable from S in LJ, and write S LJ S, if S is derivable in LJ extended by the axioms S. Similarly for LK.
The system LJ is extended by axioms defining a preorder that we will use in the definition of orderization to come. One should keep in mind that the special Skolem symbols are used to describe Kripke models, as explained in the introduction.
Axiom for preorder
The following axioms describe that is a preorder on K with root ι.
Axiom for existence
The following axioms are used to describe the domain of a node via the existence predicate and the binary function , :
The constant is interpreted as an element of the domain at the root, which therefore is not empty.
Note that the last axiom implies ⇒ E ι, t and Kk ⇒ E k, t for every closed term t in L ∪ { }. Intuitively the axiom means that ifd belongs to D k , then so does f (d). Observe that these axioms do not imply that
for k l, which should hold if an expression E k, d is meant to decribe the domain D k . As we will see, the next axiom implies just that.
Axiom for upwards persistency
As mentioned above, A k, d is meant to describe that Ad is forced at node k. The following axiom describes the upwards persistency in Kripke models, only for atomic formulas, which, as we will see later, suffices.
Observe that this implies k l, E k, d ⇒ E l, d , the property that was commented on above.
The logics IQCO and CQCO are IQC and CQC extended by the I(S) of all S ∈ Ax o . As usual, the axioms are presented as open formulas (or sequents), but when applied in a proof their universally quantified version is used.
Observe that strictly speaking IQCO and CQCO are not logics but theories, as they are not closed under substitution.
Calculi for preorders
Let LJO be the calculus LJ to which the axioms Ax o have been added. We write io for LJO . Let LKO be the calculus LK extended by the axioms Ax o . We write co for LKO . In the section on completeness we will prove that for all sequents S ∈ L: LJ S ⇔ io S and LK S ⇔ co S, which follows naturally from the fact that L does not contain the Skolem predicates , K, and E, and the Skolem functions ι, , and , .
Lemma 1 (Atomic Cut Lemma)
For every proof in LJO or LKO there is a proof in the same system of the same endsequent that only contains cuts which cutformulas are atomic.
In Section 9 it will be shown that the quantifier free fragments of these calculi are decidable, and that the calculi have the disjunction property
and the term existence property
T ∃xA(x) ⇒ ∃t(t a term) T A(t).
The semantics
The semantics of the logics IQCO and CQCO are based on Kripke models. Here we briefly recall what these are and fix notation. To avoid variable clashes in what follows, the language of Kripke models is always assumed to be disjunct from L and L s unless the models are explicitly constructed in terms of these languages. The models are defined for the full language L ∪ L o ∪ L s . If L contains equality it is treated as any other binary predicate for the moment. It will play a special role, but only later so.
Kripke models
A classical model is a pair M = (D, I) such that D is a set and I is a map such that I(P ) is an n-ary predicate on D for every n-ary predicate P , I(f ) is an n-ary function on D for every n-ary function f (constants are treated as 0-ary functions).
I(t)
denotes the interpretation of a term t under I, which is defined as usual.
), which is defined as usual for classical models. A frame is a pair (W, ) where W is a nonempty subset of K and is a partial order on W with a root. A Kripke model on a frame F = (W, ) is a quadruple
are classical models that satisfy the persistency requirement: for all k ∈ W , for all predicates P (x) and for allc ∈ D k , and all terms t,
In particular, I k (t) = I l (t) for all k and l since the models are rooted. Observe that the symbols K and are used both as the Skolem predicates in L s and as the name of a model and its assecibility relation. We find this ambiguity convenient as it suggests a connection that indeed exists in many theorems to come. At places where it could cause confusion we will be explicit about which interpretation of the symbols is meant. Given a Kripke model K = (W, , D, I) the forcing relation is defined as usual:
and extend K, k A to all sentences in the usual way:
We use the same notation for sequents, where it is understood that k S if and only if k I(S). Observe that =, if present in L, is interpreted in the models as an arbitrary binary predicate, because interpreting it as real equality would make it decidable.
Ipomodels and cpomodels
An ipomodel (intuitionistic preorder model) is a Kripke model that satisfies the axioms of LJO, i.e. Ax o . A cpomodel (classical preorder model) is a classical model that satisfies the axioms of LKO, i.e. Ax o . We write io A when A is forced in all ipomodels. We write S io S if I(S) if forced in all ipomodels that force all formulas I(S ) for S ∈ S. For cpomodels, M |= A and the like are defined as usual for classical models. We write |= co S if S holds in all cpomodels.
Soundness and completeness of the proof systems
Theorem 2 For sets of closed sequents S and closed sequents S: 
Translations
We define a translations (·) k from formulas to formulas which will translate formulas provable in LJ to formulas provable in LJO. 
The translation is inductively defined as follows.
To avoid variable clashes we require that all variables added in the translation are distinct and differ from all variables in the original formula. Strictly speaking, the definition above is the definition of a translation on formulas up to equivalence. We will often write
and similarly for predicates of arbitrary arity. Note that if A is in L and Kl
Example 1 For predicates P and Q we have
Observe that ¬(A k ) is not of the form B l , although in some cases it might be equivalent to it.
By formula induction the following lemma can be proved easily.
Lemma 2 For a formula A(s) in which K and do not occur, and in in which s are the only terms,
where all free variables in A and B are amongx.
Proof We prove the second statement for (∀x∀y(A(x, y) → B(x, y))) k . We write A for A(x, y), etc. Note that
Thus the direction from left to right of the lemma is clear. For the other direction, suppose, reasoning in LJO, that we have ∀l
, E m, y and A n . By the upwards persistency and preorder axioms it follows that k n and E n, x and E n, y . Hence B n follows. ♥ We define two operations on models that correspond to the above translation on formulas, one for Kripke models and one for cpo's.
A third translation (·) cd is introduced that translates ipo's into cpo's that are almost equivalent to it with respect to formulas of the form A k :
The (·) o translation on Kripke models
The construction we present below is one that will often occur in the sequel: it is a method to build a model which domain consists of the terms in a certain language, which are then interpreted as themselves.
Pick an element y ∈ D r . To avoid term clashes in what follows we assume W , D i , and the languages all to be disjunct. We write
In the definition of J, the P is an n-ary predicate different from K, E and , and f is different from ι and . Observe that for c ∈ D o k the expression k Pc is well-defined. Also note that in the definition of E, the k, c is an element of D o , which it should be, E being a unary predicate. It is easy to see that K o is a cpomodel; we only treat the existence axioms. That E ι, holds in K o follows from the fact that ι and are interpreted as r and y and whence K o |= E r, y . Recall that the second existence axiom is (c 1 , . . . , c n ) because all terms except ι and are interpreted as themselves, and these two constants do not occur in f (c 1 , . . . , c n ) . Recall that k,c is short for k, c 1 , . . . , k, c n and that we write A k (t) for (A(t)) k . Observe that for all predicates P and all termss, both in L:
Proof With formula induction. Let k ∈ W . The basic case follows from (1) and
This follows immediately by the induction hypothesis on l and the fact that 
or, by contraposition,
This follows from the induction hypothesis in the same way as in the above cases. ♥
The (·)
o translation on cpomodels
[k] denotes the equivalence class of k.
Thus all f ∈ L are interpreted as the constant function mapping all elements to J( ). Recall that we assume that all models are given in a language that has no elements in common with 
follows from the existence axiom Ax ex for f ∈ L, and from the fact that M |= E k, for f ∈ L. Observe that for predicates P and terms s, both in L, we have
To illustrate this:
Proof With formula induction. The basic case follows from (2) and the fact that A is in L andē ∈ D [k] . For the induction step we treat implication and existential quantification. Recall that ∀l kB is short for ∀l(k l ∧ Kl → B). We suppress the elementsē ∈ D [k] . We have to show that
This follows from the induction hypothesis on l.
For existential quantification we have to show that
cd translation on ipomodels
Here k i is just a symbol, namely k with label i, and thus k i is distinct from k j whenever i = j. To avoid variable clashes below we assume W , the K i , the D i and the languages to be disjunct from each other. The construction below slightly resembles the () o translation on Kripke models.
Lemma 6 K cd is a cpomodel.
Proof We treat the existence and upwards persistency axioms, the preorder axioms are trivial. For the existence axioms, that K cd satisfies the first one, i.e. K cd |= E ι, , follows by definition. For the second axiom, suppose K cd |= Kk ∧ E k,c . We distinguish the cases k = ι and k = l i . In the first case, this implies that
c , this implies thatc ∈ D i , i Kl and i E l,c . Hence by the existence axiom, i E l, f (c) for any f ∈ L, and again, since f (c) ∈ D i and f (c) is interpreted as itself in
cd satisfies Ax up can be established as follows. Suppose K cd |= Kk ∧ Kl ∧ k l ∧ E k,c ∧ P k,c for some predicate P not equal to and K. We have to show that K cd |= P l,c . We distinguish the cases that k = ι and k = ι. 
In the latter case it follows that
Proof Observe that k and k i do not occur in A as L is assumed to be disjunct from W , the K i and the D i . For predicates P different from K, E and , we have to show that for all termss(x) in L
s(c) ⇔ K, i P k,s(c) .
Note that we can assumes(x) ∈ L because we only have to consider atomic formulas P (s(x)) in L. The equivalence holds because in K cd the term k i ,s(c) is interpreted as itself, and then the definition of forcing for atomic formulas applies. The induction steps for ∧ and ∨ are easy. We treat the other cases. Note that
, where A and B are short for Ac and Bē, where 
By the induction hypothesis it follows that h A m and h B m , which implies i ∀l k(
A l → B l ). ∃: Consider ∃x(E k, x ∧ A k x),d ∈ D such that K cd |= E k i , d ∧ A k i d. From K cd |= E k i , d it follows that d ∈ D i and K, i E k, d . The induction hypothesis gives K, i A k d. Hence there exists a e ∈ D i such that K, i A k e, namely e = I i (d). ⇐: Suppose K, i E k, d ∧ A k d for some d ∈ D i . Clearly, dc ∈ D i . Hence the induction hypothesis implies K cd |= E k i , d ∧ A k i d. ∀: Consider ∀l k∀x(E l, x → A l x), where Ax is short for Axc, where Axȳ ∈ L andc ∈ D i . ⇒: Suppose K, i ∀l k∀x(E(l, x) → A l x) and pick a h ≥ i such that for some l, d ∈ D h , h Kl ∧ l k ∧ E l, d and h A l d. Since i ≤ h, dc ∈ D h . Thus also dc ∈ D, and l h ∈ K h .
Thus by the induction hypothesis and the definition of , K and E, K
cd |= Kl h ∧ k i l h ∧ E l h , d and K cd |= A l h d. Therefore, K cd |= ∀l k i ∀x(E l, x → A l x). ⇐: Suppose that for some l, d ∈ D, K cd |= Kl ∧ l k i ∧ E l, d and K cd |= A l d. From K cd |= Kl ∧ l k i it follows that l = m h ∈ K h for some h ∈ W and m ∈ D h , and h Km and i ≤ h k m. Whencec ∈ D h . From K cd |= E m h , d it follows that d ∈ D h and h E m, d . Hence h A m d by the induction hypothesis, which implies K, i ∀l k∀x(E l, x → A l x). ♥
Orderization
In this section we define the notion of orderization that we consider to be an alternative to Skolemization in constructive settings. Recall that expressions Kl are often supressed in formulas: e.g.
(∀l kA(l)) S is an abbreviation of (∀l(Kl ∧ k l → A(l))
S , and whence equals Kl ∧ k l → A S (k). Recall that A S and S S denote the Skolemization of a formula A and a sequent S, see the introduction. Note that the two S's in S S have a different meaning. The orderization A o of a formula A is a formula (A k ) S , where all the variables introduced in the translation from A to A k belong to L s . In particular, k ∈ L s . As is the case for Skolemization, the orderization of a formula is unique up to the renaming of variables, constants, and function symbols. The orderization A( k, x 1 , . . . , k, x n ).
Example 2 Here follow some examples. For functions f and arguments d we write f d for f (d). Recall that A k,x is short for
Observe that, like standard Skolemization, equivalent formulas do not necessarily have equivalent orderizations. For example,
Thus in many cases the orderization of a formula can simplified considerably by considering an equivalent form.
Soundness and completeness of orderization
From now on S always denotes a closed sequent. Note that S k is not closed as it contains one free term, k. It is well-known (folklore) that
Lemma 8 For any theory T : T LK S ⇔ T LK S
Therefore,
Lemma 9 For any theory T , for all S:
Next we turn to the intuitionistic theories.
Proof We prove the equivalence by contraposition. ⇐: Assume LJ S and let S = (Γ ⇒ ∆). Thus there is a Kripke model K that forces Γ and refutes ∆ at a node that we call k. 
Proof Note that this lemma does not imply that LKO ⊆ LJO, which is definitely not the case: even Kk, E k, x ⇒ P k, x , ¬P k, x is not derivable in LJO.
The direction from left to right of the lemma follows from the fact that LJO ⊆ LKO. For the other direction, suppose io S k for a closed sequent S. Let S = (Γ ⇒ ∆), and thus 
Proof By the previous lemma's and Corollary 1 it suffices to show that are distinct, as in the first one k is free and in the latter l is. Of course, they are equal up to the renaming of the variables.
Theorem 4 For every theory
Proof All these equivalences follow from the corresponding statements above for LJO pure. The first equivalence is Corollary 1. As an example, we prove that
⇒: Assume T LJ S and let S = (Γ ⇒ ∆). Hence there is a Kripke model K of T that forces Γ and refurtes ∆ at a node that we call k. Then the cpomodel K o satisfies Γ k and Kk and refutes ∆ k by Lemma 4. Since K is a Kripke model of T every node in it satisfies ∀x( Π → Θ) for every axiom (Π → Θ) of T with free variablesx. Again by Lemma 4, this implies that 
o has the same proof as for LJO pure, using the fact that Skolemization is also complete in case only some but not necessarily all the strong quantifiers in a formula are replaced. ♥ The remainder of this section is devoted to analogues of this theorem in which the theory T k is replaced by theories closer to T itself. The following two lemmas give conditions under which such theorems might be obtained.
Equality
The first adaption of T k concerns the equality axioms of T , in case it contains these. Note that in this case = belongs to L, which is the language of T . We will see that the () k translations of the equality axioms can be replaced by the axioms itself. Let T be a theory in L that includes the equality axioms
We denote by T k the theory in L ∪ L o consisting of the axioms of T plus
Observe that this axiom is part of Ax k eq , which is given by the following axioms, where we have left out the standard parts as explained at the beginning of
Compare these axioms to equality axioms in type structures, where there exist = σ for any type σ.
Proof We treat the case co , the other one being similar. The direction from left to right is clear. For the other direction, let M = (D, I) be a cpomodel of T that refutes S. We build a cpomodel N = (D, J) of T k that refutes S as follows. . From this it follows that N refutes S and is a model of T . That it is a model of Ax k follows immediately from the interpretation of E and , in N . That N is a cpomodel is also easy to verify. ♥ We will return to theories that contain equality in the section on applications below.
Atomic theories
In the next section we will apply the results obtained so far to the intuitionistic theories of equality and of groups. In the light of Theorem 4, if a theory T does not contain many implications or quantifiers it will be close to T k , often implying it. The theories of equality, groups, apartness and linear orders are examples of this. The reason that we have included the axioms ⇒ Kι and ⇒ E ι, instead of ⇒ ∃xKx and Kk ⇒ ∃x E k, x is that otherwise LJO would be a theory which axioms contain quantifiers. Due to lack of space we will in this paper only discuss atomic theories, which are theories in which the antecedent of every axiom consists of formulas of the form P (x) for some predicates P and free variablesx, and the succedent is an atomic formula, so of the form Q(t) for some termst and predicate Q. Observe that atomicity of a theory is a stricter requirement than having the axiom sequents consist of atomic formulas only. As before S ranges over closed sequents.
Lemma 15 For atomic theories
Clearly, in N every closed term is interpreted as itself.
Observe that because of this definition it follows that N is a model of Ax po and Ax ex . Ax up is satisfied in case the predicate is E. That all of Ax up holds in N will be shown below. Validity in N on atomic formulas in L is defined inductively via the relations |= i . Let the axioms of T outside LJO be {S i | i ∈ I} for some set I. Because T is atomic we can suppose all these sequents to be of the form x) ), where the P ij and P i are predicates in L and thet i (x) are terms in L. For P in L we define:
Observe that in this definition l,ē =c means thatc and l,ē are literally the same string of symbols, and it therefore is a stronger requirement than merely M |= l,ē =c. A similar remark applies to
Note that since all terms in D are closed terms in
l is well-defined. For the basic case of (3) we have to show that for all P (x) in L:
The direction from right to left follows immediately from the definition of |= 0 and the interpretation of terms in N . The other direction is proved by induction on |= i . The case n = 0 is trivial. Suppose N |= n+1 P l,c for some l such that M |= Kl ∧ k l ∧ E l,c . Hence for some i ∈ I, P l,c = P i (t i (ē)) and N |= n P ih (ē) for all h ≤ m i . Thus P = P i and l,c =t i (ē). Since P i (t i (x)) is in L, it follows thatt i (x) is in L, and whencet i (x) =x, and thust i (ē) =ē = l,c , since , is not in L. By the induction hypothesis M |= P ih l,c . Using the fact that
is an axiom of T k , and hence valid in M , it follows that M |= P i l,t i (c) , i.e. M |= P i l,c , that is, M |= P l,c . The induction steps for the connectives are straighforward. For the quantifiers,
since E is interpreted in the same way in N as in M . Therefore the induction hypothesis applies.
Again, the induction hypothesis plus the fact that E is interpreted in he same way in N as in M , implies the result. For the universal quantifier, consider the formula
Thus the induction hypothesis and the interpretation of K,
follows immdediately from the definition of N . To see that N is a cpomodel it only remains to be shown that it satisfies Ax up for P ∈ L. Therefore, suppose N |= Kl ∧Km∧l m∧E l,c ∧P l,c . We have to show that N |= P m,c . By equation (3) it suffices to show that M |= k l. We prove this with induction to |= n . For n = 0, i.e. if N |= 0 P l,c , the statement is clear. And if N |= n+1 P l,c , then for some i, P l,c = P i (t i (ē)) and N |= n P ih (ē) for all h ≤ m i . Thus the same reasoning as above applies:
is in L and , is not. m i ≥ 1 and the induction hypothesis for N |= n P i1 l,c implies that M |= k l. It remains to be shown that N also is a model of Ax k ,
This follows from (3), using that l,x = l,ȳ and l, f (x) = l, f (ȳ) are of the form B l for some B in L since f and = are both in L, and the fact that M satisfies the sequent.
♥
The following theorem shows that T k is an interesting theory.
Theorem 5 For every atomic theory
Proof By Corollary 2 it suffices to show that
These statements follow from Theorem 4 and Lemma 15, using the fact that T k derives T k by assumption. ♥
Herbrand's Theorem
In the context of intuitionistic logic there is a natural analogue of Herbrand's theorem. Following [7] , define a sequent S to be a ∧∨-expansion (or a Herbrand expansion) of a sequent S if every positive occurrence of an existential quantifier
A(s i ) for some terms s i , and every negative occurrence of a universal quantifier QxA(x) is replaced by n i=1 A(t i ) for some terms t i . By considering proofs in LJ the following analogue of Herbrand's theorem is easy to prove. Again, S will always denote a closed sequent.
Theorem 6 For every universal theory T and every sequent S in L without strong quantifiers there exists an ∧∨-expansion S of it such that
Proof We treat the case that S only contains one quantifier, a positive occurrence of ∃xAx. Consider all places in the proof where the quantifier is introduced. Because the quantifier occurs positively this can only happen in an application of right weakening or R∃. It cannot occur in an axiom of T since it is a universal theory, and it cannot appear in the axioms of LJO because these are quantifier free. Suppose there are n places where ∃xAx is introduced via R∃, and that they are of the form
Then we transform the proof by replacing every such occurrence by
Finally we replace instances of RW on ∃xAx,
It is not difficult to see that the result is a proof of the ∧∨-expansion of A in which the ∃xAx's have been replaced by n i=1 A(t i ). Observe that the side conditions on variables in R∀ and L∃ cannot be violated since S does not contain strong quantifiers. ♥ A similar proof implies the same result for LJO:
Theorem 7 For every universal theory T , and for every sequent S in L without strong quantifiers there exists an ∧∨-expansion S of it such that
The theorem above is the reason that we included the axioms ( ⇒ Kι) and ( ⇒ E ι, ) in LJO, since replacing them by the sequents ( ⇒ ∃xKx) and (Kk ⇒ ∃xE k, x ) would have made LJO into a theory that is no longer quantifier free. The last theorem and Theorem 4 imply the following correspondence between predicate and propositional logic.
Corollary 3 For every theory
In particular, there exists a quantifier free ∧∨-expansion S of S o such that
Observe that the ∧∨-expansion of S o obtained via proofs of S o in LJO and LKO might be different in case the proofs of S o are distinct. However, because of the other equivalences, there is always an ∧∨-expansion for which all the equivalences hold.
Corollary 2 and Theorem 7 imply
Corollary 4 For S in L, k ∈ L s , and for all theories T for which there exists a universal theory T such that (
Clearly, if T is atomic, then T k is a universal theory. Thus by Theorem 5 we have
Observe that the decidability result in Section 9 implies that for every ∧∨-expansion of a sequent of the form S o it is decidable whether it is derivable in one of our order calculi or not.
Applications
The theory of equality
For the theory of equality iEq given by the axioms Ax eq , we have seen above what the axioms of iEq k and iEq k are. Thus in this case = belongs to L, which is the language of the theory iEq. Since iEq k is clearly universal, Corollary 3 implies
Clearly, iEq is an atomic theory and iEq k derives iEq k . Therefore, by Corollary 5 we have
The theory of groups
For the theory of groups iGrp [?], which includes the equality axioms, the group axioms of iGrp k become, when we leave out the standard parts (e for the unit and −1 for the inverse):
Observe that iGrp k derives iGrp k . Sometimes apartness is included in the theory of groups, in which case the theory is not atomic anymore. Due to lack of space we only treat the theory of groups without apartness here. In a subsequent paper we will show that similar results as the one below do hold for the theory of apartness, as well as for the theory of groups in which apartness is included. Since iGrp k is universal, and the theory of groups is atomic, and iGrp k derives iGrp k , by Corollary 3 and Corollary 5 we can conclude
Other theories
The method of transforming Theorem 4, which holds for all theories, into results that are similar in spirit to Theorem 5 and Corollary 5, can be applied to many other constructive theories and intermediate logics. However, since many of these theories fail to be atomic additional techniques have to be used to establish such results. For this reason these applications, especially to Heyting Arithmetic and the theory of apartness, will be treated seperately in a subsequent paper.
Decidability
The order calculi LJO and LKO can easily be transformed into equivalent calculi that have cut elimination. As a consequence we obtain the decidability of the quantifier free fragments of these logics. Thus also the derivability of Herbrand expansions of orderized formulas is decidable in these systems. The idea is simple: we replace the set of axioms in the calculi by their cut-hull, that is, by the closure of the axiom set under the cut rule. We are convinced that similar theorems also hold for the theory of equality and the theory of groups, but due to lack of space we have postponed proofs of these facts to a subsequent paper.
LJO and LKO
For a set of formulas Γ we write k Γ l if Kk ∈ Γ or k = ι, and Kl ∈ Γ or l = ι, and k = l or k = ι or k l ∈ Γ. Γ is the transitive closure of Γ . Observe that Kk ∈ Γ if and only if k Γ k, except when k equals ι, in which case ι Γ ι holds for all Γ. Note that k Γ l implies k Π l for every Π that contains all formulas of the form m n and Km that belong to Γ. We write ΓΠ for Γ∪Π and ΓA for Γ∪{A} . From now on "t(x) is a term in L ∪ { , x 1 , . . . , x n }" means that t(x) contains no other symbols than the ones in L∪{ , x 1 , . . . , x n }. We say that Γ supports k, x if x = t(ȳ) for some term t(ȳ) in L ∪ { ,ȳ}, and Γ contains formulas E k i , y i such that k i Γ k. Observe that if Γ supports k, x , then so does Π for every Π that contains all formulas of the form m n, Km and E l, y that belong to Γ. Let LJO be LJO without weakening and contraction in which Γ is added to the antecedent of the axioms Ax and L⊥, and L→ and L∀ are replaced by
and in which Ax o is replaced by the following axioms
The part of LJO without these axioms is the standard Gentzen calculus G3i for intuitionistic logic without weakening and contraction [?] .
LKO is defined in a similar way: it is LKO without weakening and contraction in which Γ is added to the antecedent of the axioms Ax and L⊥, and R∃ and L∀ are replaced by
and in which Ax o is replaced by the same axioms as in the case of LJO , except that ∆ is added to all the succedents of the sequents.
Recall that forx = x 1 , . . . , x n , P k,x is short for P ( k, x 1 , . . . , k, x n ) for n-ary predicates P . Axioms (1) and (2) correspond to the partial order axioms Ax po of LJO; the sequents Γ ⇒ ι ι and Γ, Kk ⇒ ι k and Γ, Kk ⇒ k k all follow from (2). Axiom (3) corresponds to the upwards persistency axiom, except for the case that P equals E, but this case has been included in axiom (4), which the reader can check for himself. Axiom (4) corresponds to the existence axioms of LJO: note that it implies ⇒ E ι, as well as Kk ⇒ E k, t for any closed term t in L∪{ }. Clearly, LJO and LKO are equivalent to LJO and LKO.
Lemma 16 (Cut elimination)
LJO and LKO have cut elimination.
Proof From the standard proof of the cut elimination theorem for the variant of LJ in which contraction and weakening are built-in into the axioms [?], it follows that every proof in LJO can be reduced to a proof in which the only cuts are cuts on axioms. Therefore it suffices to show that the set of axioms of LJO is closed under cuts. That is, if Γ ⇒ A and Γ, A ⇒ C are instances of certain axioms of LJO , then the conclusion Γ ⇒ C of an application of the cut
is an instance of an axiom too. It is not difficult to see that this holds when one of the axioms is Ax or L⊥, the argument can be found in the proof of cut elimination for G3i in [?]. Thus we only consider the case that both axioms are instances of the order axioms (1)-(4) of LJO . Recall that we write ΓA for Γ∪{A} . Observe that if the left hypothesis is an instance of (1), and thus A = Kι, it suffices to show that k ΓA l implies k Γ l, which follows immediately from the definition of . If the right hypothesis is an instance of (1), then so is the conclusion of the cut. Therefore suppose that both hypotheses are instances of (2)-(4). We distinguish by cases. We suppose A is principal in both hypotheses, because if it is not, the conclusion of the cut is an instance of the same axiom of which the right hypothesis is an instance. First suppose the left hypothesis is an instance of (2), i.e. A is of the form m n. Note that it suffices to show that k ΓA l implies k Γ l. So suppose k ΓA l. If k = m or l = n, then k Γ l follows immediately. Thus suppose k = m and l = n. Because the left hypothesis is an instance of (2) we have m Γ n. That is, k Γ l. Second, suppose the left hypothesis is an instance of (3), i.e. A is of the form P ( k,x ), for P in L. Since we assumed that the cut formula is principle in both hypotheses, the right hypothesis is an instance of (3) or (4). In case both hypotheses are instances of (3) we have the following cut
where l Γ k, and Γ supports all l, x i and m, x i . Since A is also principal in the right hypotheses, k Γ m or l Γ m holds. Hence l Γ m. Thus the conclusion of the cut is an instance of (3). If the left hypothesis is an instance of (3) and the right hypothesis is an instance of (4), then A is not principal in the right hypothesis, and so the conclusion of the cut is an instance of (4). Finally, suppose the left hypothesis is an instance of (4), i.e. A is of the form E k, t(x) , where t(x) is a term in L ∪ { ,x}, and Γ supports k, t(x) . Since we assumed the cut formula to be principal in both hypotheses, the right hypothesis is an instance of (3) or (4) . In the former case we have the following cut Γ, P ( l,ȳ ) ⇒ E k, t(x) Γ, P ( l,ȳ ), E k, t(x) ⇒ P ( m,ȳ ) Γ, P ( l,ȳ ) ⇒ P ( m,ȳ ) for some P in L, where Γ supports k, t(x) , and Γ ∪ {E k, t(x) } supports l, y i and l Γ m. The only non trivial case occurs when E k, t(x) plays a role in the fact that Γ supports l, y i . Thus if y i = r(t(x),z) for some r(t(x),z) in L ∪ { ,x,z}. Note that whence k Γ l. Since also Γ supports k, t(x) , it follows that it supports l, y i . Therefore the conclusion of the cut is an instance of (3). In case both hypotheses are instances of (4) we have the following cut
Γ ⇒ E k, t(x) Γ, E k, t(x) ⇒ E l, s(ȳ) Γ ⇒ E l, s(ȳ)
where t(x) and s(ȳ) are terms in L ∪ { ,x} and L ∪ { ,ȳ} respectively, and Γ supports k, t(x) and Γ ∪ {E k, t(x) } supports l, s(ȳ) . The only non trivial case occurs when E k, t(x) plays a role in the fact that Γ supports l, s(ȳ) . Thus t(x) equals some y i and k Γ l. Since Γ supports k, t(x) this implies that it supports l, s(ȳ) . Hence the conclusion of the cut is an instance of (4) . ♥
Corollary 9
The quantifier free fragments of LJO and LKO are decidable. Thus so are the quantifier free fragments of LJO and LKO.
Proof That the quantifier free fragment of LKO is decidable follows from the following two facts. All propositional rules in the calculus are invertible, meaning that the hypotheses of the rules are derivable if the conclusion is. And the complexity of the principal formulas in the hypotheses of a rule is lower than that of the principal formula in the conclusion. Therefore bottom-up proof search for quantifier free formulas is a finite process, from which decidability follows. The argument for LJO is similar, but one has to take into account that its left implication rule L'→ is not invertible. There are many results in the literature that show how this problem can be dealt with for the system G3i; the number of applications of L'→ to the same formula in a proof can be bounded in various ways, and from this the decidability of the quantifier free fragment of the logic follows [?] . These results and their proofs carry over to LJO , and thereby the decidability of the quantifier free fragment of LJO is established. ♥
Corollary 10
The derivability of Herbrand expansions of orderized sequents is decidable in LJO , LJO, LKO and LKO.
Corollary 11 LJO and LJO have the disjunction property and the term existence property.
